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Plato’s Physics ofMeta
The Ontology of Image in the Timaeus
Andrea Le Moli
Plato’s Physics enjoys a peculiar place in the whole of the Athenian’s
Thought and written production. It does not build up a structured
system or doctrine, rather it can be deduced from a series of scattered
hints across the whole group of the Dialogues. The only exception
is represented by the cosmology of the Timaeus, even though it is
hard to consider its unique mix between spiritualism, geometry and
theory of elements as an organic physical theory. This could prevent
everyone in reputing Plato’s Physics a signicant step towards the
evolution of the discipline to Aristotle and beyonds. But this would
also denounce a lack in hermeneutical skill and in historical attitude
as well. The aim of this paper is to suggest that an enquiry on what is
peculiar in Plato’s Physics should point to another direction, precisely
to the connection between his theory of elements and his ontology.
My Hypothesis is that the relationship between the ultimate denition
of Being in dialogues such as Sophist, Parmenides and Philebus and the
cosmology of the Timaeus, is a much stronger than the one which is
commonly held. The rst three dialogues describes Being as a costant
intertwining of some basic determinations (also called ’genres’) which
appears principally in the synthetic structure of human logos. The way
in which the basic determinations of Being stay in mutual relation to
each other is described both as a symploke and a koinonia, i. e. as a
necessity for each determination to maintain itself in connection with
all the others to be thought or uttered in language. What we can call
an original syntaxis rules the composition (synthesis) of Forms-Genres
that gives human thinking and speaking structures and, subsequently,
rules the whay in which logos appeals to Being. Every determination
both contains and excludes the others. The One must be dierientiated
from the Other to be as One. Being must be one in itself and also
dierentiated from the One to be thought in itself, and so on. This is
not distant at all from the way in which Plato presents the relation
between the elements of material world in the Timaeus. A geometri-
cal rule of composition prescribes the possibility for one element to
join another (dynamis koinonias) or not. The same geometrical rule
disciplinates the building up of the elements out of the basic concepts
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of geometry: point, line and surface. Since they all derive from the
original unity of the point, whose movement generates line, the move-
ment of the latter generating surface and so one, the elements of the
physical world are direct expression of the rst synthesis which always
occurs between the basic geometrical (and mathematical) determina-
tions. Is out of a such synthesis that Plato~deduces~the need for the
four elements. And out of the same basis he can also deduce the forma-
tion of the geometrical gures and, subsequently, of the basic series of
solids which corresponds to the physical elements in their material sha-
pe:cube,~tetrahedron,~octahedron,~icosahedron,~dodecahedron. This
may only seem a more sophisticated and spiritualized version of old
Theories of elements such as Empedocles’, Anaxagoras’ and Pytha-
goras’. As a matter of fact, this theory can be linked to the Ontology
outlined in the dialectical Dialogues to argue that Plato’s Physics is
not a sectorial compartment of that mixed bundle of doctrines which
constitutes his ’System’. Platonic Physics do not gain a new legitima-
cy as organic and scientic theory by exploring its connection with
geometry and biology from the time of Plato. This is pretty obvious
and does not give any particular originality to Plato’s position. The
challenge we shall issue to Plato’s Physics is rather to establish a strong
link between its contents and the actual innovation represented by his
new – relational – concept of Being. It may thus be shown how much
the ontological foundation enriches and does not limit the horizon of
Physics and the representation of man as a natural being. Determined
in its phyisical constitution by structures wich lie beyond – meta -
the world of phenomena, the very existence of man as living being
is the harmonic intertwining of the two realms that species Plato’s
metaphyisics. Out of this scenery, out of this meta, there is no life,
neither physical nor intellectual.
The thesis from which this paper starts is a very common one:
Plato’s cosmology and Physics cannot be separated from his Ontology;
we even could dare to say that they are an expression of his Ontology.
So stated, it may seem nothing more than a triviality. But something
changes if one really asks what does it mean in general and also in
the platonic context, “Ontology”. If we would outline a denition, we
might right say: Ontology is the description of a net of logical relation-
ships in which it is possible to address something by assigning to it
some essential properties. These properties must identify it either by
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distinguishing it from something else or by connecting it to something
related. That is what we call: addressing something as a being and out
of which we may pose such questions as: “what is there?” and “how
it is it?”. We’re talkin about a notion of Ontology that, so stated, has
an ancient story and a modern one as well. As a matter of fact, this
denition is contained in the famous opening sentence of Aristotle’s
Metaphysics Gamma1: “There is a science which investigates being
as being and the attributes which belong to this in virtue of its own
nature (estin episteme tis he theorei to on hei on kai ta toutoi hypar-
chonta kath’auto)”. But it goes through the entire course of western
philosophy and is made ocial – as it were – between the end of the
XIX century and the beginning of the XX in Germany. In this period
some post-hegelian and post-positivistic tendencies such as Neokan-
tianism, Philosophy of Values, Historism and Phenomenology (among
the others), analyze the methodics and results of empiric sciences by
referring themselves expressly to an ontological perspective and so
ending up with a new notion of ontology as a whole. According to all
these perspectives, Ontology is the result of a peculiar point of view,
the one of the science. The legitimacy of an ontological space derives
from the ability by a science to show the necessary belonging of some
properties to something – which is called object. These properties must
be connected to each other by recognizable laws. The whole of the
laws which describe the relation between an object’s essential pro-
perties form the objectivity of an object and its consistence as present
being. The model devised by these objectivistic ontologies provides, to
a certain extent, the paradigmatic basis to all scientical-philosophical
ontologies still today: this is the case of social ontology, cognitive
ontology, mind and language ontology and so on. But what it does
happen if we try to conceive platonic ontology on the basis represented
by this model? What it occurs is something odd: we do not succeed in
applying correctly even the rst requested denition of being-object:
something which is dened by the necessary belonging to it of a whole
of properties, these latter connected to each other by recognizable laws.
I will try to argue my point by showing that it happens because Plato’s
ontology is a twofold one – one may even say: an ambivalent ontology,
1. Aristotele, Metaphysica Gamma 1, 1003 a 20 ss.
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just as ambivalent is the concept of being with which, from The Sophist
onwards, it operates. In the Sophist Being (to on) is described by Plato
as one of the forms-genres which, together with all the others, takes
part in dening the consistence of something as a being. In this way
being is element and also nal result of the composition of all these
forms-genres in a dialectical unity. We so run into a rst obstacle which
prevents us from reading Plato’s Ontology in the matrix dened by
objectivistic tendencies we quoted above: if we try to answer roughly
with platonic theoretical elements to the questions asked by contempo-
rary ontology, what we obtain is a mess of paradoxical results. What
could indeed be a platonic reply to such questions as: how many sorts
of being do exist? And to which one do physical beings belong? If we
take Plato’s Timaeus as the nal point of his ontological Thought we
could be compelled to face answers so framed: two types of being do
exist: one which always is and never becomes, the other one which
never is and always becomes (ti to on aei, genesin de ouk echon, kai ti
to gignomenon men aei, on de oudepote 28a), whereas physical being
is expressly said to belong to the second genre. What kind of sense
does it make the attribution of the essential feature of not being, of
constant becoming to something addressed as physical being? None, in
a strict logical context. This would mean: the notion of physical being
would not be a coherent one, rather the result of a deprived, almost
metaphorical application of the proper notion of being-something. And
as much metaphorical must then be, according to Plato’s Ontology, the
notion of physical science. In the platonic scheme science is a steady
knowledge of causes and principles, that is a dimension preserved from
every trace of becoming and changing. This would mean the unpossi-
bility to make science of physical world by remaining on the surface
of becoming and change, that is without turning to another level of
reality: the conceptual rmness and stability of causes and principles.
To make science of the physical world one should go beyond (meta) the
realm of becoming and nd access to a new dimension. According to
this, the notions of physical being and physical science refer themselves
to deprived concepts of being and science. They allude only meta-
phorically to full concepts of being and science which are expressed
by the rmness and stability that should be gained overcoming the
world of phenomena. If we assume strictly this distinction between two
realms of reality stated by Plato (Being = the eternal world of concepts
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vs. Becoming = the physical world of phenomena), the very notion
of phyisical science appears to be a contradiction. A discourse which
tries to apply the categories of science and being to the domain of
phenomena without the mediation represented by the meta is there-
fore convicted to remain metaphoric, a second-order logos, almost –
in platonic words – a myth. And as a matter of fact, as it is presented
in the Timaeus, physical discourse owns the same structural features
of myth and poetry. It is about a second-order representation, a likely
story which seems to serve only to point in the right direction, to the
purpose to let blink in its trasparency the realm of the true logos. This
one, the logos of the science, can be gained only via pure reason, that is
through a reason uncompromised by any suggestion derived by senses.
As a second-order discourse, platonic Physics is constantly looking
for its proper location in the platonic corpus. I personally endorse the
thesis this location may be found in the constant developing of the
notion of image (eikon) by Plato. This could be proved by analyzing not
only the contents of the Timaeus but its textual structure as well. The
fact that the notion of image gives structure to the physical logos in
the Timaeus is foremost evident in the puzzle-box construction of the
dialogue, always wavering between the necessity of giving a scientic
account of its object (the nature of human world) and the unpossi-
bility to accomplish this task. This appears clearly by analyzing the
sequence of its textual parts and elements.The dialogue opens with an
absence: “One, two, three; but where, my dear Timaeus, is the fourth
of those who were yesterday my guests and are to be my entertainers
to-day?” (17a) and goes forward by electing others as substitutes for
the absent: “Then, if he is not coming, you and the two others must
supply his place ”. This passage is commonly read as a reminder of
the connection between the present dialogue and the one immediately
preceding: the Republic. The discussion about the constitution of ideal
state should have left the space open for the description of the state
in the concreteness of its living aairs, rst of all in a situation of
radical movement: war. This substitutional structure appears again
in the next section, where it is said that imitators, poets and sophists
cannot give any realistic account of the constitution of the state as a
living entity. Rather should be Timaeus, a mathematician, the one who
can give an adequate description in terms of plausible image (eikon)
of what a state in a situation of war must be. Two kind of image are
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here at stake: the one proposed by false imitators, uncapable to lead to
the right direction (to the truth) and the one oered by Timaeus: one
someway more apt than the others to let reality emerge. But the rst
account of Timaeus is not only presented as an eikon, even plausible:
it is also made of intertwined eikones and speaks essentially according
to its nature: human world, the only one we can speak of, belongs to
the realm of becoming (genesis), because it shows the constant change
of phenonena and it is accessed through the data conveyed by senses.
Or, to be more exact, through the transformation caused in the sense-
organs by external inputs. Here comes an assertion which constitutes
the rst axiom of Plato’s (Meta)Physics: ~“everything that becomes
or is created must of necessity be created by some cause, for without
a cause nothing can be created. The work of the creator, whenever
he looks to the unchangeable and fashions the form and nature of his
work after an unchangeable pattern, must necessarily be made fair
and perfect; but when he looks to the created only, and uses a created
pattern, it is not fair or perfect.~ (28ab)”. What here matters is rst
of all the qualication of the cause as pattern, model (paradeigma) of
what is created. And further, 29b: “having been created in this way, the
world has been framed in the likeness of that which is apprehended by
reason and mind and is unchangeable, and must therefore of necessity,
if this is admitted, be a copy (eikon) of something”. What is at stake
here is something we should consider rather peculiar in the scenery of
greek physical theory around the half of IV Century: if it was plainly
common to consider the world of becoming (of transformation) caused,
for in the realm of senses no transformation seem to happen without
cause it did not appear so self-evident that the relationship between
cause and model should be read as a relation pattern-copy. This hap-
pens upon the presupposition, drawn from the analysis of sensorial
experience, that a resemblance should exist between the cause and the
caused, the stimulus and the reaction. It was common to the Greek
theory of sensation from Empedocles to Aristotle to consider sensorial
experience based on the notion of likeness. Here, then, Plato applies a
model drawn by the physical description to the relation between the
two realms of being, reversing to a certain extent the nexus of founda-
tion between them. That this is the case, can be showed by recalling
the way in which the entire account of Timaeus is presented, (29cd):
“If then, Socrates, amid the many opinions about the gods and the
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generation of the universe, we are not able to give notions which are
altogether and in every respect exact and consistent with one another,
do not be surprised. Enough, if we adduce probabilities as likely as any
others; for we must remember that I who am the speaker, and you who
are the judges, are only mortal men, and we ought to accept the tale
which is probable and enquire no further”. This apparent clarication
shows, on the contrary, that the reversal of the foundation has already
set itself in motion. From this point onwards, Plato pursued indeed a
reversed course of argumentation: the description of the genesis of our
world (kosmos) from God’s point of view. And still there is nothing so
simple, because the discourse maintain itself on the level of the eikon,
that is it attempts to give a likely account of what might be hidden in
the mind of God. Obviously in assuming that “God” (or the Demiurge)
is here acting in accord (an other platonic axiom) with his rational
nature.2 The complexity of this description has something to do with
the intertwining of levels that here are at work and not only with its
specical contents and details. The eikon is here a discourse which
claimed to speak in the name of God, as though as we may infer from
the apparent legality of this world the presence of a rational project
behind it. Timaeus’ logos replicates the ontological structure of an
image, that is it gives access in a diminished way to something which
cannot reveal itself as it really is. It provides a mediated access to a
pure reality by opening a space of dierence between our world and a
rational pattern which must have constituted it from the beginning.
Plato’s Metaphysics is precisely the opening of such dierential space
in which our world ceases to exist on its own and becomes an image
of something else. And this is precisely the way in which an image
works: apparently losing its own being and resulting diminished, but
as a matter of fact increasing its being in becoming the physical means
by which something more can announce its hidden presence in this
world. Thus, as eikota logos, physical discourse is always a bivalent
one. It speaks at the same time from the point of view of the image
and on account of the model. It is a discourse structurally stretched
beyond (meta) the bonds of its universe. Physics is always Metaphysics.
2. Timaeus, 30bc: “Wherefore, using the language of probability, we may say
that the world became a living creature truly endowed with soul and intelligence by
the providence of God” (transl. Jowett 1892).
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What we may now ask, once we understood the connection between
image and pattern from a structural point of view, is what determines
essentially this connection. That is to say: what the meta-nexus really
contains and what makes it able to link in a mutual foundation physics
and metaphysics. In other words we may ask: what belongs equally
to the stance of the image and to the point of view of the pattern?
One way is to proceed to infer the existence of a rational model by
the presence of partially realized beauty, goodness or mathematical
order in this world. These are features which may be recognized in
this world only in a diminished and always relative form, and in this
way they seem to defer the possibility of mathematical and ethical per-
fection on a pure theoretical level, so proving at least an ideal existence
of the absolute. After Nietzsche’ Criticism, hovewer, is not possible
anymore to endorse this thesis without passing through the whole
mess of objections and arguments relaunched by contemporay Ger-
man and French Philosophy (Heidegger, Deleuze, Derrida etc.). But
this does not mean to consider in principle the way which proceed
by the analysis of the feature of physical world unapproachable. It
is the same Nietzsche who gives us implicitly a trace of a possibile
reapproach to this problem. His unintentional solution could be found
by reecting on the Metaphysics’ constitutive nexus: the meta insofar
it is rooted in the notion of eikon, of image bearing a likeness. It may
also be argued that Plato’s metaphysical foundation moves itself in
a reversed manner compared to the one criticized by Nietzsche. The
contents of the connection between the two worlds, the contents of
the meta, must be feature which seem to pertain in the rst istance to
the physical world, not ideal properties which our world bears only in
a diminished way. As a matter of fact, the main innovation of platonic
perspective is to have brought features which were supposed to belong
only and essentially to the physical world into the realm of the eternal
and ideal being: life and movement. An operation which replicates on
a cosmological level the ontological integration of not-being, being-
dierent and movement as constitutive genres of Being in the Sophist.
Movement and dierence (variety, diversity) form together the life of
Being according to which eternal being can eectively serve as pattern
and ground of physical world. Many passages of Timaeus’ Text seem
to conrm this approach. At 30cd “the Deity, intending to make this
world like the fairest and most perfect of intelligible beings, framed
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one visible animal comprehending within itself all other animals of a
kindred nature”. This visible animal is called to panteles zoon, the being
perfectly living (31b). The rst thing which derives from this patterm
is the unity of the skies, living being which contains all beings kind
to him. Its visible and tangible nature implies that it is made of the
elements that provide the principles of visibility and tangibility: re
and earth. Two further elements, water and air, are then introduced
according to another ontological law: on cannot mix two elements to
shape a physical gure without the mediation of a third one. And one
cannot shape a solid out of a surface without the further mediation
of a fourth element. What it comes after are the rules for the shaping
of our world into a sphere and the denition of physical world as the
living being which keeps in itself all the others. What it comes out
from this description is basically the fact that the characteristics of
our physical world do not respond to any theological presupposition.
On the contrary, this description keeps on working even if one read
the gure of the Deity as a metaphorical notion3: the expression of
the innate physio-biological functionality of the physical world. It
does not seem hasty to arm that platonic cosmos might work on
the only basis of the same two principles which in their unity give
structure to the organization of living beings in contemporary theories
of life: information (a pattern oriented to the formation of a particular
shape) and energy (the quantity of movement needed to realize the
pattern). We won’t give any right to Plato’s speculation if we will
keep on considering his physical theory an ontological contradiction
or – at best – the result of theological, physically undemonstrable,
presuppositions. Not even if we consider the whole of the Timaeus
a spiritualized version of actual biological themes. Plato’s Physics
deals ontologically with notion of life: that is it denes living being as
capable of self-movement, nality and self-organization in a costant
evolution of levels ruled by the eciency and economics which may be
recognized in the variety of its forms. Its last object is the living being
which best fulls these criteria. Maybe its only unavoidable concession
to spiritualism is the deep conviction that such a living being shall do
3. A thesis held amog the others by Baltes 1996, Halfwassen 2000 and Ferrari
2003
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exist to form the unity of all the others (anima mundi). One may raise
the doubt if this conviction is well-based or not. But, in doing this,
one has to take position about the debate concerning the notion of
soul. Which is indeed a core element of the platonic construction, but
also a notion which can be converted in its denition to be accepted in
every physical debate. So we did along our discussion: we have tried
to convert the notion of soul in the ability of life as self-movement to
aim at the realization of a pattern (energy and information). In this way
we have tried to bypass – at least so far - the objections which could be
prejudicially posed to a paper dealing with Plato, the Timaeus, Myth,
Poetry, God and Soul, in a Congress about Physics.
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